device: timers: seed unsafe rng before use for jitter
Forgetting to seed the unsafe rng, the jitter before followed a fixed pattern, which didn't help when a fleet of computers all boot at once. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
e42c6c4bc2
commit
60683d7361
@ -8,12 +8,20 @@
|
||||
package device
|
||||
|
||||
import (
|
||||
"math/rand"
|
||||
"crypto/rand"
|
||||
unsafeRand "math/rand"
|
||||
"sync"
|
||||
"sync/atomic"
|
||||
"time"
|
||||
"unsafe"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
func init() {
|
||||
var seed int64
|
||||
rand.Read(unsafe.Slice((*byte)(unsafe.Pointer(&seed)), unsafe.Sizeof(seed)))
|
||||
unsafeRand.Seed(seed)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// A Timer manages time-based aspects of the WireGuard protocol.
|
||||
// Timer roughly copies the interface of the Linux kernel's struct timer_list.
|
||||
type Timer struct {
|
||||
@ -144,7 +152,7 @@ func expiredPersistentKeepalive(peer *Peer) {
|
||||
/* Should be called after an authenticated data packet is sent. */
|
||||
func (peer *Peer) timersDataSent() {
|
||||
if peer.timersActive() && !peer.timers.newHandshake.IsPending() {
|
||||
peer.timers.newHandshake.Mod(KeepaliveTimeout + RekeyTimeout + time.Millisecond*time.Duration(rand.Int31n(RekeyTimeoutJitterMaxMs)))
|
||||
peer.timers.newHandshake.Mod(KeepaliveTimeout + RekeyTimeout + time.Millisecond*time.Duration(unsafeRand.Int63n(RekeyTimeoutJitterMaxMs)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -176,7 +184,7 @@ func (peer *Peer) timersAnyAuthenticatedPacketReceived() {
|
||||
/* Should be called after a handshake initiation message is sent. */
|
||||
func (peer *Peer) timersHandshakeInitiated() {
|
||||
if peer.timersActive() {
|
||||
peer.timers.retransmitHandshake.Mod(RekeyTimeout + time.Millisecond*time.Duration(rand.Int31n(RekeyTimeoutJitterMaxMs)))
|
||||
peer.timers.retransmitHandshake.Mod(RekeyTimeout + time.Millisecond*time.Duration(unsafeRand.Int63n(RekeyTimeoutJitterMaxMs)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user