wireguard-go/device/device_test.go

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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
*
* Copyright (C) 2017-2023 WireGuard LLC. All Rights Reserved.
*/
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package device
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/hex"
"fmt"
"io"
"math/rand"
"net/netip"
"os"
"runtime"
"runtime/pprof"
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
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"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"time"
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"gitea.hbanafa.com/hesham/wireguard-go/conn"
"gitea.hbanafa.com/hesham/wireguard-go/conn/bindtest"
"gitea.hbanafa.com/hesham/wireguard-go/tun"
"gitea.hbanafa.com/hesham/wireguard-go/tun/tuntest"
)
// uapiCfg returns a string that contains cfg formatted use with IpcSet.
// cfg is a series of alternating key/value strings.
// uapiCfg exists because editors and humans like to insert
// whitespace into configs, which can cause failures, some of which are silent.
// For example, a leading blank newline causes the remainder
// of the config to be silently ignored.
func uapiCfg(cfg ...string) string {
if len(cfg)%2 != 0 {
panic("odd number of args to uapiReader")
}
buf := new(bytes.Buffer)
for i, s := range cfg {
buf.WriteString(s)
sep := byte('\n')
if i%2 == 0 {
sep = '='
}
buf.WriteByte(sep)
}
return buf.String()
}
// genConfigs generates a pair of configs that connect to each other.
// The configs use distinct, probably-usable ports.
func genConfigs(tb testing.TB) (cfgs, endpointCfgs [2]string) {
var key1, key2 NoisePrivateKey
_, err := rand.Read(key1[:])
if err != nil {
tb.Errorf("unable to generate private key random bytes: %v", err)
}
_, err = rand.Read(key2[:])
if err != nil {
tb.Errorf("unable to generate private key random bytes: %v", err)
}
pub1, pub2 := key1.publicKey(), key2.publicKey()
cfgs[0] = uapiCfg(
"private_key", hex.EncodeToString(key1[:]),
"listen_port", "0",
"replace_peers", "true",
"public_key", hex.EncodeToString(pub2[:]),
"protocol_version", "1",
"replace_allowed_ips", "true",
"allowed_ip", "1.0.0.2/32",
)
endpointCfgs[0] = uapiCfg(
"public_key", hex.EncodeToString(pub2[:]),
"endpoint", "127.0.0.1:%d",
)
cfgs[1] = uapiCfg(
"private_key", hex.EncodeToString(key2[:]),
"listen_port", "0",
"replace_peers", "true",
"public_key", hex.EncodeToString(pub1[:]),
"protocol_version", "1",
"replace_allowed_ips", "true",
"allowed_ip", "1.0.0.1/32",
)
endpointCfgs[1] = uapiCfg(
"public_key", hex.EncodeToString(pub1[:]),
"endpoint", "127.0.0.1:%d",
)
return
}
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
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// A testPair is a pair of testPeers.
type testPair [2]testPeer
// A testPeer is a peer used for testing.
type testPeer struct {
tun *tuntest.ChannelTUN
dev *Device
ip netip.Addr
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
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}
type SendDirection bool
const (
Ping SendDirection = true
Pong SendDirection = false
)
func (d SendDirection) String() string {
if d == Ping {
return "ping"
}
return "pong"
}
func (pair *testPair) Send(tb testing.TB, ping SendDirection, done chan struct{}) {
tb.Helper()
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
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p0, p1 := pair[0], pair[1]
if !ping {
// pong is the new ping
p0, p1 = p1, p0
}
msg := tuntest.Ping(p0.ip, p1.ip)
p1.tun.Outbound <- msg
timer := time.NewTimer(5 * time.Second)
defer timer.Stop()
var err error
select {
case msgRecv := <-p0.tun.Inbound:
if !bytes.Equal(msg, msgRecv) {
err = fmt.Errorf("%s did not transit correctly", ping)
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2020-12-15 00:07:23 +01:00
}
case <-timer.C:
err = fmt.Errorf("%s did not transit", ping)
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
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case <-done:
}
if err != nil {
// The error may have occurred because the test is done.
select {
case <-done:
return
default:
}
// Real error.
tb.Error(err)
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
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}
}
// genTestPair creates a testPair.
func genTestPair(tb testing.TB, realSocket bool) (pair testPair) {
cfg, endpointCfg := genConfigs(tb)
var binds [2]conn.Bind
if realSocket {
binds[0], binds[1] = conn.NewDefaultBind(), conn.NewDefaultBind()
} else {
binds = bindtest.NewChannelBinds()
}
// Bring up a ChannelTun for each config.
for i := range pair {
p := &pair[i]
p.tun = tuntest.NewChannelTUN()
p.ip = netip.AddrFrom4([4]byte{1, 0, 0, byte(i + 1)})
level := LogLevelVerbose
if _, ok := tb.(*testing.B); ok && !testing.Verbose() {
level = LogLevelError
}
p.dev = NewDevice(p.tun.TUN(), binds[i], NewLogger(level, fmt.Sprintf("dev%d: ", i)))
if err := p.dev.IpcSet(cfg[i]); err != nil {
tb.Errorf("failed to configure device %d: %v", i, err)
p.dev.Close()
continue
}
if err := p.dev.Up(); err != nil {
tb.Errorf("failed to bring up device %d: %v", i, err)
p.dev.Close()
continue
}
endpointCfg[i^1] = fmt.Sprintf(endpointCfg[i^1], p.dev.net.port)
}
for i := range pair {
p := &pair[i]
if err := p.dev.IpcSet(endpointCfg[i]); err != nil {
tb.Errorf("failed to configure device endpoint %d: %v", i, err)
p.dev.Close()
continue
}
// The device is ready. Close it when the test completes.
tb.Cleanup(p.dev.Close)
}
return
}
func TestTwoDevicePing(t *testing.T) {
goroutineLeakCheck(t)
pair := genTestPair(t, true)
t.Run("ping 1.0.0.1", func(t *testing.T) {
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2020-12-15 00:07:23 +01:00
pair.Send(t, Ping, nil)
})
t.Run("ping 1.0.0.2", func(t *testing.T) {
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2020-12-15 00:07:23 +01:00
pair.Send(t, Pong, nil)
})
}
func TestUpDown(t *testing.T) {
goroutineLeakCheck(t)
const itrials = 50
const otrials = 10
for n := 0; n < otrials; n++ {
pair := genTestPair(t, false)
for i := range pair {
for k := range pair[i].dev.peers.keyMap {
pair[i].dev.IpcSet(fmt.Sprintf("public_key=%s\npersistent_keepalive_interval=1\n", hex.EncodeToString(k[:])))
}
}
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(len(pair))
for i := range pair {
go func(d *Device) {
defer wg.Done()
for i := 0; i < itrials; i++ {
if err := d.Up(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed up bring up device: %v", err)
}
time.Sleep(time.Duration(rand.Intn(int(time.Nanosecond * (0x10000 - 1)))))
if err := d.Down(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("failed to bring down device: %v", err)
}
time.Sleep(time.Duration(rand.Intn(int(time.Nanosecond * (0x10000 - 1)))))
}
}(pair[i].dev)
}
wg.Wait()
for i := range pair {
pair[i].dev.Up()
pair[i].dev.Close()
}
}
}
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2020-12-15 00:07:23 +01:00
// TestConcurrencySafety does other things concurrently with tunnel use.
// It is intended to be used with the race detector to catch data races.
func TestConcurrencySafety(t *testing.T) {
pair := genTestPair(t, true)
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2020-12-15 00:07:23 +01:00
done := make(chan struct{})
const warmupIters = 10
var warmup sync.WaitGroup
warmup.Add(warmupIters)
go func() {
// Send data continuously back and forth until we're done.
// Note that we may continue to attempt to send data
// even after done is closed.
i := warmupIters
for ping := Ping; ; ping = !ping {
pair.Send(t, ping, done)
select {
case <-done:
return
default:
}
if i > 0 {
warmup.Done()
i--
}
}
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2020-12-15 00:07:23 +01:00
}()
warmup.Wait()
applyCfg := func(cfg string) {
err := pair[0].dev.IpcSet(cfg)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// Change persistent_keepalive_interval concurrently with tunnel use.
t.Run("persistentKeepaliveInterval", func(t *testing.T) {
var pub NoisePublicKey
for key := range pair[0].dev.peers.keyMap {
pub = key
break
}
cfg := uapiCfg(
"public_key", hex.EncodeToString(pub[:]),
"persistent_keepalive_interval", "1",
)
for i := 0; i < 1000; i++ {
applyCfg(cfg)
}
})
// Change private keys concurrently with tunnel use.
t.Run("privateKey", func(t *testing.T) {
bad := uapiCfg("private_key", "7777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777777")
good := uapiCfg("private_key", hex.EncodeToString(pair[0].dev.staticIdentity.privateKey[:]))
// Set iters to a large number like 1000 to flush out data races quickly.
// Don't leave it large. That can cause logical races
// in which the handshake is interleaved with key changes
// such that the private key appears to be unchanging but
// other state gets reset, which can cause handshake failures like
// "Received packet with invalid mac1".
const iters = 1
for i := 0; i < iters; i++ {
applyCfg(bad)
applyCfg(good)
}
})
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2020-12-15 00:07:23 +01:00
// Perform bind updates and keepalive sends concurrently with tunnel use.
t.Run("bindUpdate and keepalive", func(t *testing.T) {
const iters = 10
for i := 0; i < iters; i++ {
for _, peer := range pair {
peer.dev.BindUpdate()
peer.dev.SendKeepalivesToPeersWithCurrentKeypair()
}
}
})
device: use channel close to shut down and drain encryption channel The new test introduced in this commit used to deadlock about 1% of the time. I believe that the deadlock occurs as follows: * The test completes, calling device.Close. * device.Close closes device.signals.stop. * RoutineEncryption stops. * The deferred function in RoutineEncryption drains device.queue.encryption. * RoutineEncryption exits. * A peer's RoutineNonce processes an element queued in peer.queue.nonce. * RoutineNonce puts that element into the outbound and encryption queues. * RoutineSequentialSender reads that elements from the outbound queue. * It waits for that element to get Unlocked by RoutineEncryption. * RoutineEncryption has already exited, so RoutineSequentialSender blocks forever. * device.RemoveAllPeers calls peer.Stop on all peers. * peer.Stop waits for peer.routines.stopping, which blocks forever. Rather than attempt to add even more ordering to the already complex centralized shutdown orchestration, this commit moves towards a data-flow-oriented shutdown. The device.queue.encryption gets closed when there will be no more writes to it. All device.queue.encryption readers always read until the channel is closed and then exit. We thus guarantee that any element that enters the encryption queue also exits it. This removes the need for central control of the lifetime of RoutineEncryption, removes the need to drain the encryption queue on shutdown, and simplifies RoutineEncryption. This commit also fixes a data race. When RoutineSequentialSender drains its queue on shutdown, it needs to lock the elem before operating on it, just as the main body does. The new test in this commit passed 50k iterations with the race detector enabled and 150k iterations with the race detector disabled, with no failures. Signed-off-by: Josh Bleecher Snyder <josh@tailscale.com>
2020-12-15 00:07:23 +01:00
close(done)
}
func BenchmarkLatency(b *testing.B) {
pair := genTestPair(b, true)
// Establish a connection.
pair.Send(b, Ping, nil)
pair.Send(b, Pong, nil)
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pair.Send(b, Ping, nil)
pair.Send(b, Pong, nil)
}
}
func BenchmarkThroughput(b *testing.B) {
pair := genTestPair(b, true)
// Establish a connection.
pair.Send(b, Ping, nil)
pair.Send(b, Pong, nil)
// Measure how long it takes to receive b.N packets,
// starting when we receive the first packet.
var recv atomic.Uint64
var elapsed time.Duration
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
var start time.Time
for {
<-pair[0].tun.Inbound
new := recv.Add(1)
if new == 1 {
start = time.Now()
}
// Careful! Don't change this to else if; b.N can be equal to 1.
if new == uint64(b.N) {
elapsed = time.Since(start)
return
}
}
}()
// Send packets as fast as we can until we've received enough.
ping := tuntest.Ping(pair[0].ip, pair[1].ip)
pingc := pair[1].tun.Outbound
var sent uint64
for recv.Load() != uint64(b.N) {
sent++
pingc <- ping
}
wg.Wait()
b.ReportMetric(float64(elapsed)/float64(b.N), "ns/op")
b.ReportMetric(1-float64(b.N)/float64(sent), "packet-loss")
}
func BenchmarkUAPIGet(b *testing.B) {
pair := genTestPair(b, true)
pair.Send(b, Ping, nil)
pair.Send(b, Pong, nil)
b.ReportAllocs()
b.ResetTimer()
for i := 0; i < b.N; i++ {
pair[0].dev.IpcGetOperation(io.Discard)
}
}
func goroutineLeakCheck(t *testing.T) {
goroutines := func() (int, []byte) {
p := pprof.Lookup("goroutine")
b := new(bytes.Buffer)
p.WriteTo(b, 1)
return p.Count(), b.Bytes()
}
startGoroutines, startStacks := goroutines()
t.Cleanup(func() {
if t.Failed() {
return
}
// Give goroutines time to exit, if they need it.
for i := 0; i < 10000; i++ {
if runtime.NumGoroutine() <= startGoroutines {
return
}
time.Sleep(1 * time.Millisecond)
}
endGoroutines, endStacks := goroutines()
t.Logf("starting stacks:\n%s\n", startStacks)
t.Logf("ending stacks:\n%s\n", endStacks)
t.Fatalf("expected %d goroutines, got %d, leak?", startGoroutines, endGoroutines)
})
}
type fakeBindSized struct {
size int
}
func (b *fakeBindSized) Open(port uint16) (fns []conn.ReceiveFunc, actualPort uint16, err error) {
return nil, 0, nil
}
func (b *fakeBindSized) Close() error { return nil }
func (b *fakeBindSized) SetMark(mark uint32) error { return nil }
func (b *fakeBindSized) Send(bufs [][]byte, ep conn.Endpoint) error { return nil }
func (b *fakeBindSized) ParseEndpoint(s string) (conn.Endpoint, error) { return nil, nil }
func (b *fakeBindSized) BatchSize() int { return b.size }
type fakeTUNDeviceSized struct {
size int
}
func (t *fakeTUNDeviceSized) File() *os.File { return nil }
func (t *fakeTUNDeviceSized) Read(bufs [][]byte, sizes []int, offset int) (n int, err error) {
return 0, nil
}
func (t *fakeTUNDeviceSized) Write(bufs [][]byte, offset int) (int, error) { return 0, nil }
func (t *fakeTUNDeviceSized) MTU() (int, error) { return 0, nil }
func (t *fakeTUNDeviceSized) Name() (string, error) { return "", nil }
func (t *fakeTUNDeviceSized) Events() <-chan tun.Event { return nil }
func (t *fakeTUNDeviceSized) Close() error { return nil }
func (t *fakeTUNDeviceSized) BatchSize() int { return t.size }
func TestBatchSize(t *testing.T) {
d := Device{}
d.net.bind = &fakeBindSized{1}
d.tun.device = &fakeTUNDeviceSized{1}
if want, got := 1, d.BatchSize(); got != want {
t.Errorf("expected batch size %d, got %d", want, got)
}
d.net.bind = &fakeBindSized{1}
d.tun.device = &fakeTUNDeviceSized{128}
if want, got := 128, d.BatchSize(); got != want {
t.Errorf("expected batch size %d, got %d", want, got)
}
d.net.bind = &fakeBindSized{128}
d.tun.device = &fakeTUNDeviceSized{1}
if want, got := 128, d.BatchSize(); got != want {
t.Errorf("expected batch size %d, got %d", want, got)
}
d.net.bind = &fakeBindSized{128}
d.tun.device = &fakeTUNDeviceSized{128}
if want, got := 128, d.BatchSize(); got != want {
t.Errorf("expected batch size %d, got %d", want, got)
}
}